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Memory is prone to illusions. When people are presented with lists of words associated
with a non-presented critical lure, they produce a high level of false recognitions (false
memories) for non-presented related stimuli indistinguishable, at the explicit level, from
presented words (DRM paradigm). We assessed whether true and false DRM memo-
ries can be distinguished at the implicit level by using the autobiographical IAT (aIAT), a
novel method based on indirect measures that permits to detect true autobiographical
events encoded in the respondent’s mind/brain. In our experiment, after a DRM task par-
ticipants performed two aIATs: the first aimed at testing implicit memory for presented
words (true-memories aIAT) and the second aimed at evaluating implicit memory for crit-
ical lures (false-memories aIAT). Specifically, the two aIATs assessed the association of
presented words and critical lures with the logical dimension “true.” Results showed that
the aIAT detected a greater association of presented words than critical lures with the
logical dimension “true.” This result indicates that although true and false DRM memories
are indistinguishable at the explicit level a different association of the true and false DRM
memories with the logical dimension “true” can be detected at the implicit level, and sug-
gests that the aIAT may be a sensitive instrument to detect differences between true and
false DRM memories.
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INTRODUCTION
It is known that human memory is prone to various kinds of
distortions and illusions (Roediger, 1996; Schacter, 1999; Lof-
tus, 2003). Among these memory errors, many researchers have
focused on false recognition, whereby people incorrectly claim
that they have recently seen or heard a stimulus they have not
encountered (Underwood, 1965). It has been shown that, in con-
trast to deception, memory illusions are often unaccompanied
by a subjective feeling that people are responding untruthfully.
On the contrary, memory illusions such as those produced in
the Deese–Roediger–McDermott paradigm (DRM, Deese, 1959;
Roediger and McDermott, 1995), are accompanied by a sense
of recollection which, at the explicit level, makes them indistin-
guishable from true memories. DRM false memories are obtained
by presenting lists of words related to a non-presented critical
lure. The probability of recalling or recognizing the critical lure is
usually quite high (Roediger and McDermott, 1995; Balota et al.,
1999; Stadler et al., 1999; Budson et al., 2002). Previous findings
have shown that critical lures seem to elicit the same recollective
quality (remember judgments) of presented items (e.g., Roediger
and McDermott, 1995) and participants are even able to state in
which voice they heard the non-presented critical lure when half
list items had been presented by a female voice and half by a male
voice (Payne et al., 1996).
Imaging evidence, however, has revealed some notable dif-
ferences between true and false memories. In terms of overall
differences, true memories have been strongly associated with the
medial temporal lobe (MTL) regions (e.g., Cabeza et al., 2001;
Okado and Stark, 2003; Slotnick and Schacter, 2004; Dennis et al.,
2012), whereas false memories have been associated with the pre-
frontal cortex (PFC) and parietal regions (e.g., Schacter et al., 1996,
1997; Cabeza et al., 2001; Slotnick and Schacter, 2004; Garoff-
Eaton et al., 2007). For example, Cabeza et al. (2001), using fMRI
in combination with a verbal variant of the DRM paradigm, have
shown that true recognition was associated with a higher activation
of the parahippocampal gyrus (PHG), whereas false recognition
was associated with a higher activation of the orbito-PFC. These
results have been corroborated by Okado and Stark (2003). It has
been proposed that MTL activity related to true-memories reflects
mainly a recollection mechanism, whereas frontoparietal activity
related to false memories reflects mainly a familiarity mechanism
(Kim and Cabeza, 2007). In agreement with this view, patient stud-
ies and neuroimaging studies showed that MTL regions such as the
hippocampus and posterior PHG are critical for recollection (for
a review, see Yonelinas, 2002; Eichenbaum et al., 2007), whereas
frontoparietal regions such as the anterior (aPFC) and dorsolat-
eral PFC (DLPFC) are critical for familiarity (Cansino et al., 2002;
Yonelinas et al., 2005; Duarte et al., 2010). Similarly, Moritz et al.
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(2006) using the DRM has shown that an increase in confidence
at recognition was associated with an activation in the cingulate
cortex along with medial temporal regions, whereas increments in
doubt (i.e., when people showed low-confident judgments) were
related to activation in the superior posterior parietal cortex. Taken
together, these results show that, although at an explicit level true
and false recognitions may be indistinguishable, they are processed
by different neural substrates. Thus, at some level neurological
markers can differentiate between true and false recognitions,
suggesting that true and false DRM memories might also be dis-
tinguished at the implicit level, when individuals are not directly
asked to recognize true/false items.
A novel method based on indirect measures that might dis-
tinguish between true and false DRM memories is the autobio-
graphical IAT (aIAT; Sartori et al., 2008). The aIAT is a variant of
the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) which
investigates the memory representation of autobiographical events
and is specifically aimed at accurately detecting autobiographical
events encoded in the respondent’s mind/brain.
The aIAT includes stimuli belonging to four categories. Two
categories are logical categories and are represented by statements
which are always true (e.g., I am in front of a computer) or always
false (e.g., I am in front of a television) for the respondent. Two
other categories are represented by alternative versions of an auto-
biographical event (e.g., I went to Paris for Christmas vs. I went
to London for Christmas), only one of the two being true. The
true autobiographical event can be identified because it gives rise
to faster RTs when it shares the same motor response as true
statements.
The accuracy of the aIAT in detecting the true autobiographi-
cal event is very high, both at the group level and at the individual
level (about 91%), and it is a flexible tool because it can evalu-
ate any type of autobiographical memory that may be described
with a sentence. Moreover, in comparison with other lie-detection
or memory-detection techniques (e.g., fMRI) it has several more
advantages: it can be administered quickly (10–15 min), it is based
on an unmanned analysis (no training for the user is necessary), it
requires low-tech equipment (a standard PC is sufficient), and it
can also be administered remotely to many participants (e.g., via
the web) for screening purposes.
The main objective of the present study was to determine
whether differences between true and false DRM memories can
be detected with the aIAT (Sartori et al., 2008). To this end,
we used eight word lists developed by Deese (1959) and mod-
ified by Roediger and McDermott (1995) in order to produce
false recognitions of non-presented critical lures with high lev-
els of probability. The DRM procedure consisted of an encoding
stage, in which participants heard semantically associated word
lists (e.g., butter, food, eat, sandwich, rye, etc.), each followed by a
recognition task which included previously presented words (e.g.,
sandwich), the non-presented critical lure, which is the strongest
word associated with the presented items (e.g., bread), and unre-
lated non-presented distracters (e.g., dog). In accordance with
several studies (e.g., Roediger and McDermott, 1995), we expected
to find high false-alarm rates for the non-presented critical lures,
whereas false-alarm rates for the non-presented distracters would
be low. In the DRM recognition tasks participants were asked to
give Present/Absent responses (i.e., they had to classify words as
Present when the item had been presented and as Absent when the
item had not been presented during the encoding stage).
The DRM task was followed by the two aIAT tasks. One aIAT
evaluated the association of the presented items with the logi-
cal dimension “true” (true-memories aIAT), whereas the second
aIAT evaluated the association of the critical lures with the logical
dimension“true”(false-memories aIAT). By comparing the results
of the two aIATs one could observe if true memories (presented
items in the true-memories aIAT) and false memories (critical
lures in the false-memories aIAT) were encoded differently as sug-
gested by the results of neuroimaging studies. Therefore, if differ-
ences between presented items and critical lures exist at the implicit
level and can be identified by the aIAT, the two main indexes in this
instrument should be different for the true-memories aIAT and
the false-memories aIAT. Specifically, both the aIAT effect (i.e., the
difference in average RTs between the congruent and the incon-
gruent condition) and the D index (Greenwald et al., 2003); i.e.,
the difference between the incongruent and congruent conditions
within each aIAT measuring accuracy at the level of the individual)
would reveal a difference between true and false DRM memories.
On the contrary, if the aIAT is based on the individual’s awareness
that the critical lure was presented or if presented items and critical
lures are characterized by a non-distinguishable level of activation
at the implicit cognitive level, then the aIAT would be ineffective
in detecting any difference between presented items and critical
lures.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-six undergraduate students (aged 19–33, mean= 23.94,
SD= 2.97; 18 females) volunteered to take part in the experi-
ment. All participants were informed about the general nature
of the research and voluntary option to participate. Only par-
ticipants that gave their informed consent participated to the
experiment. The study was approved by the Ethics Committee of
the Department of General Psychology of the University of Padua.
EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGM, PROCEDURE, AND STIMULI
The experimental paradigm and the structure of the tasks are
schematically shown in Table 1. All participants were tested in
two sessions. In the first session, they performed the DRM task
and in the second session they performed two aIATs.
The DRM task consisted of two stages. In the first stage eight
lists of 15 Italian words were auditorily presented at a rate of one
word every 2 s (see Ciaramelli et al., 2006). These lists were the
Italian translation and adaptation of the lists of semantic asso-
ciates drawn up by (Stadler et al., 1999). Each list converged on a
critical lure representing the gist of the list (e.g., the word bread for
a list comprising butter, food, eat, sandwich, rye, etc.). Immediately
after the presentation of each list, participants were administered
a recognition test with eight words, which included three words
presented in the previous list (targets), and five non-presented
words. Targets were the items in serial position 1, 8, and 10 from
that list. The non-presented words included the critical lure of the
presented list (critical lure) and unrelated distracters, that is, the
critical lure of a non-presented list (control lure) and the items
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognitive Science August 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 310 | 2
Marini et al. Implicit differences in DRM memories
Table 1 | Scheme of the experimental paradigm and structure of the tasks.
First session Second session
DRM task True-memories aIAT False-memories aIAT
Stage 1: encoding task
eight lists of 15 words
Block 1: logical discrimination Block 1: logical discrimination
10 true/false factual statements (20 trials) 10 true/false factual statements (20 trials)
“A” key: true category “A” key: true category
(true factual sentences; e.g., I am in front of a
computer)
(true factual sentences; e.g., I am in front of a computer)
“L” key: false category “L” key: false category
(false factual sentences, e.g., I am in front of a
television)
(false factual sentences, e.g., I am in front of a television)
Stage 2: recognition test Block 2: initial episodic discrimination Block 2: initial episodic discrimination
eight lists of eight words (three
targets, one critical lure and four
distracters)
10 sentences relating to the DRM paradigm (20 trials) 10 sentences relating to the DRM paradigm (20 trials)
“N” key: presented words “A” key: present category “A” key: present category
(targets; e.g., BUTTER) (sentences referred to presented and recognized
targets; e.g., I heard the word BUTTER)
(sentences referred to non-presented critical lures
recognized as presented; e.g., I heard the word BREAD)
“M” key: non-presented words “L” key: absent category “L” key: absent category
(critical lures and distracters;
e.g., BREAD and TIRED)
(sentences related to non-presented distracters; e.g.,
I heard the word TIRED)
(sentences related to non-presented distracters; e.g., I
heard the word TIRED)
Block 3: double categorization or congruent
condition
Block 3: double categorization or congruent condition
10 true/false factual statements and 10 sentences
relating to the DRM paradigm (60 trials)
10 true/false factual statements and 10 sentences relating
to the DRM paradigm (60 trials)
“A” key: true/present category “A” key: true/present category
(both true factual statements and sentences referred
to presented and recognized targets; e.g., I am in
front of a computer and I heard the word BUTTER)
(both true factual statements and sentences referred to
non-presented critical lures recognized as presented; e.g.,
I am in front of a computer and I heard the word BREAD)
“L” key: false/absent category “L” key: false/absent category
(both false factual statements and sentences related
to non-presented distracters; e.g., I am in front of a
television and I heard the word TIRED)
(both false factual statements and sentences related to
non-presented distracters; e.g., I am in front of a television
and I heard the word TIRED)
Block 4: reversed episodic discrimination Block 4: reversed episodic discrimination
10 sentences relating to the DRM paradigm (40 trials) 10 sentences relating to hearing to the DRM paradigm (40
trials)
“A” key: absent category “A” key: absent category
(sentences related to non-presented distracters; e.g.,
I heard the word TIRED)
(sentences related to non-presented distracters; e.g., I
heard the word TIRED)
“L” key: present category “L” key: present category
(sentences referred to presented and recognized
targets; e.g., I heard the word BUTTER)
(sentences referred to non-presented critical lures
recognized as presented; e.g., I heard the word BREAD)
Block 5: reversed double categorization or
incongruent condition
Block 5: reversed double categorization or incongruent
condition
10 true/false factual statements and 10 sentences
relating to the DRM paradigm (60 trials)
10 true/false factual statements and 10 sentences relating
to the DRM paradigm (60 trials)
“A” key: true/absent category “A” key: true/absent category
(both true factual statements and sentences related to
non-presented distracters; e.g., I am in front of a
computer and I heard the word TIRED)
(both true factual statements and sentences related to
non-presented distracters; e.g., I am in front of a computer
and I heard the word TIRED)
“L” key: false/present category “L” key: false/present category
(both false factual statements and sentences referred
to presented and recognized targets; e.g., I am in
front of a television and I heard the word BUTTER)
(both false factual statements and sentences referred to
non-presented critical lures recognized as presented; e.g.,
I am in front of a television and I heard the word BREAD)
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in serial position 1, 8, 10 of the same non-presented list (control
target). Considering all eight word lists, the total number of items
used for the eight recognition tests included 64 words, 24 pre-
sented, and 40 non-presented. The order of presentation of the
eight words in each recognition test was randomized. In the DRM
recognition test, participants were instructed to respond by press-
ing one of two keys of a keyboard: the Presented key (N key) if the
word was presented and the Absent key (M key) if the word was
not presented.
After 5 min, participants performed the aIATs. The first aIAT
(true-memory aIAT) evaluated the association of the targets (true
memories) with the logical dimension “true,” whereas the second
aIAT (false-memories aIAT) assessed the association of the critical
lures (false memories) with the logical dimension “true.”
Participants were asked to categorize 10 factual statements
(which are the same across all aIATs) belong to logical dimen-
sions “true” or “false” and 10 statements referring to the DRM lists
(which changed participant by participant according to the result
of the recognition memory phase). Each aIAT consisted of five sep-
arate blocks of categorization trials. In each trial, a statement was
presented on the center of a computer monitor. Participants were
requested to categorize the statements as quickly and accurately as
possible by pressing one of two labeled keys.
In Block 1 (20 trials; logical discrimination), participants classi-
fied factual statements as true or false. Factual statements referred
to the activities of the participants during the experiment. They
were asked to press the A key (True category) if the factual sentence
was true for them (e.g., I am in front of a computer) and the L key
(False category) if the factual sentence was false for them (e.g., I
am in front of a television).
In Block 2 (20 trials; initial episodic discrimination), partici-
pants categorized statements relative to words that they could or
could not have heard during the presentation stage of the DRM as
present or absent. They pressed the A button (Present category)
to classify the sentences related to words that they had heard and
L button (Absent category) to classify the sentences referred to
words that they had not heard.
In Block 3 (60 trials; double categorization or congruent condi-
tion), participants categorized both factual statements and state-
ments referring to words of the DRM lists. They were asked to press
the A key (True/Present category) to classify both the true factual
statements and sentences related to words that they had heard in
the prior DRM task, whereas the L key (False/Absent category) was
used to classify both false factual statements and sentences related
to words that they had not heard in the DRM paradigm.
In Block 4 (40 trials; reversed episodic discrimination), partic-
ipants classified only statements referring to words of the DRM
lists as in Block 2 but using a different key configuration. They
were asked to press the A key for the sentences related to word that
they had not heard in the DRM paradigm (Absent category) and
the L key for sentences related to words that they had heard in the
prior DRM paradigm (Present category).
In Block 5 (60 trials; reversed double categorization or incon-
gruent condition), participants classified both factual statements
and statements referring to words of the DRM lists as in Block
3, but in this condition they pressed the A key (True/Absent cat-
egory) for true factual statements and the sentences related to
word that they had not heard in the DRM paradigm, the L key
(False/Present category) for false factual statements and sentences
related to words that they had heard in the prior DRM paradigm.
For the true-memories aIAT, we defined as Present category the
statements referring to presented and correctly recognized targets
in the DRM task (e.g., I heard the word BUTTER), whereas in the
in the false-memories aIAT we arbitrarily defined as Present cate-
gory the sentences referring to the non-presented critical lures and
incorrectly recognized as presented in the DRM paradigm (e.g., I
heard the word BREAD). In both aIATs, we defined as Absent cat-
egory the statements referring to unrelated distracters correctly
recognized in the DRM recognition test as non-presented (e.g., I
heard the word TIRED).
Notably, in both aIATs the Absent category indicated false
events (i.e., sentences referring to having heard non-presented and
unrelated distracters), whereas the Present category indicated true
events in the true-memories aIAT (i.e., sentences referring to hear-
ing to presented targets) and false events in the false-memories
aIAT (i.e., sentences referring to hearing to non-presented critical
lures).
Reminder labels in the form of category names remained on the
monitor for the entire duration of each block. Factual true-false
statements and sentences related to present-absent words in the
DRM paradigm were alternated in Blocks 3 and 5.
In order to counterbalance the presentation order in the aIAT,
half of the participants performed first the false-memories aIAT
task, followed by the true-memories aIAT, whereas for the other
half the order was reversed.
RESULTS
RECOGNITION
Proportions of recognition were submitted to a repeated-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) with type of recognition (target hit
rates, false-alarm rates to critical lures, false-alarm rates to unre-
lated distracters – these latter collapsed across control targets, and
control lures) as the within-subject factor.
A main effect of type of recognition was obtained:
F(2,70)= 852.849, p< 0.001, η2= 0.961. Bonferroni-corrected
pairwise comparisons showed a significant difference between hit
rates for target items and false-alarm rates for unrelated distracters
[0.90 vs. 0.01%; MD= 0.888, p< 0.001, 95% CI= (0.847, 0.928)],
as well as between false-alarm rates for critical lures and false-
alarm rates for unrelated distracters [0.84 vs. 0.01%; MD= 0.830,
p< 0.001, 95% CI= (0.770, 0.890)]. The test did not reveal a sig-
nificant difference between recognition rates for target and critical
lures (90 vs. 84%; p= 0.192).
This pattern of results indicated that recognition in the DRM
task was high and not significantly different for both presented
targets and non-presented critical lures. False alarms for non-
presented distracters were significantly lower than for critical
lures. Therefore, at an explicit level false memories for the critical
lures were considered similar to true memories for the presented
targets.
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL IAT
Reaction times (RTs) obtained in Blocks 3 (congruent) and 5
(incongruent) were submitted to repeated-measures ANOVA with
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type of aIAT (false-memory aIAT vs. true-memory aIAT ) and
congruency (congruent condition vs. incongruent condition) as
within-subject factors. We note here that if participants can dis-
criminate between true and false DRM memories the interaction
between type of aIAT and congruency should be significant.
The main effect of congruency was significant: F(1,35)=
141.675, p< 0.001,η2= 0.802. Overall, RTs were faster in the con-
gruent than the incongruent condition (1173 vs. 1885 ms). The
main effect for type of aIAT was not significant: F(1,35)= 0.538,
p= 0.468, η2= 0.015. Crucially for the hypothesis that we
intended to test, we found a significant interaction between type
of aIAT and congruency: F(1,35)= 4.948, p< 0.05, η2= 0.124.
The difference between incongruent and congruent conditions
was greater in the true-memory aIAT than in the false-memory
aIAT (788 vs. 637 ms). A closer inspection showed a marginal dif-
ference in RTs between the true-memory aIAT and false-memory
aIAT tasks in the incongruent condition [1935 vs. 1834 ms,
t (35)= 1.64, p= 0.055], whereas no significant effect was found
in the congruent condition [1148 vs. 1197 ms; t (35)=−1.457,
p= 0.077].
To test whether the significant interaction obtained in the
within-subject ANOVA was affected by the presence of outlier
observations or non-constant error variance (Fox, 1997) a lin-
ear mixed model was run with type of aIAT and congruency as
independent variables and participants as random factor. Then
we performed a case resembling bootstrapping analysis on model
coefficients to derive a confidence interval for the interaction para-
meter. The 95% percentile confidence interval of the bootstrapped
interaction parameter derived from 4000 repetitions ranged from
65.2 to 208.4 and did not include zero. Therefore we can conclude
that there is a robust significant interaction between type of aIAT
and congruency.
To test the accuracy of each aIAT in detecting true and
false heard-related statements, for each participant we com-
puted the D index for each aIAT (true-memories aIAT and false-
memories aIAT ). The mean D index was positive for both aIATs
(true-memories aIAT, D score= 0.98 and false-memories aIAT, D
score= 0.86) suggesting that both critical lures and targets might
be efficiently discriminated from distracters. The one-tailed t -
test, however, showed a greater D index for the true-memories
aIAT than for false-memories aIAT [t (35)= 1.9218, p< 0.05, 95%
CI= (0.0149, +∞)] and this result replicated the findings with
raw RTs.
In sum, at the implicit level, both aIATs (true-memories aIAT
and false-memories aIAT ) showed an association both of the tar-
gets and critical lures with the logical dimension “true.” Faster
responses were observed in the congruent condition, when sen-
tences related to targets (true-memories aIAT ) and critical lures
(false-memories aIAT ) were combined with the true factual state-
ments than in the incongruent condition when they were com-
bined with the false factual statements. This association was
confirmed also by the positive value of the D index in both aIATs.
However, the significant interaction between type aIAT and
congruency – re-marked by bootstrapping analysis (4000 repeti-
tions) – and the greater D index in the true-memories aIAT than
in the false-memories aIAT, indicated that a greater association was
obtained when the logical dimension “true” was combined with
the true memories (targets) than when they were compared with
the false memories (critical lures).
DISCUSSION
The aim of the present study was to test whether false and
true DRM memories can be discriminated at the implicit level
using a novel instrument (aIAT; Sartori et al., 2008) developed
to detect autobiographical memories encoded within the respon-
dent’s mind/brain. The aIAT is a method based on indirect mea-
sures that permits us to detect which of two events is true for a
given individual. In the aIAT, participants were requested to clas-
sify statements belonging to the true or false logical dimension
and statements belonging to a true or false event by pressing one
of two response keys. Faster responses are found when the state-
ments related to the true event share the same motor response as
the statements that are always true.
In our experiment, false memories were created with the DRM
paradigm, originally developed by Deese (1959) and modified by
Roediger and McDermott (1995). Several studies have demon-
strated that the DRM paradigm produces high levels of false
episodic memories which seem to convey the same recollective
experience as true memories. Consistent with these results, we
reported here that the false-alarm rates for the non-presented crit-
ical lures were not significantly different from the hit rate for the
presented targets (0.84 vs. 0.90). The similar proportions of the
true memories for presented words and the false memories for
non-presented critical lures obtained in our experiment confirm
that false and true DRM memories cannot be discriminated at an
explicit level.
At an implicit level, the aIAT showed an association of both, pre-
sented targets and critical lures with the logical dimension “true.”
At a first level of analysis, thus, the aIAT seems to be ineffective
in detecting any difference between presented targets and criti-
cal lures. However, a closer inspection of our results showed that
aIAT detected differences between presented targets and critical
lures which cannot be distinguished at an explicit level. Indeed, we
found a greater association of the logical dimension “true” with
targets than with critical lures as indicated by the significant inter-
action obtained between type of aIAT and congruency and by the
D index. Thus, the aIAT was effective to detect differences between
true memories really encoded in the respondent’ mind and those
incorrectly perceived as that (i.e., false memories). Specifically, our
analysis shows that the aIAT is very effective in comparing true and
false DRM memories although it is not suited to identify a single
DRM memory as true or false “per se.”
The fact that both true and false-memories generated an
implicit association with the dimension “true” can be potentially
explained by taking into account that we have a greater tendency
to use “remember” judgments for presented targets than for non-
presented critical lures in a DRM task (Tulving, 1985; Roediger and
McDermott, 1995). “Remember” judgments are made when the
participant can recall specific details about an event’s prior occur-
rence. “Know” judgments are made when the participant cannot
recall specific details about the event’s prior occurrence, but she/he
nevertheless believes that it has occurred (e.g., it is familiar, but
there is no specific remembrance of its prior occurrence). Gallo
(2006), for example, in an analysis of 32 experiments which used
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Remember/Know judgments (R/K judgments) in the DRM para-
digm, found significantly more “Remember” judgments for true
memories (mean= 0.47) than for critical lures (mean= 0.40). In
addition, whereas “Remember” judgments given to related lures
were greater than those given to unrelated lures (mean = 0.06),
“Know” judgments of true and falsely recognized words did not
differ, or were greater for related lures. These results suggest that
false memories for critical lures might have a phenomenologi-
cal status similar to that of true memories but actually located
between true memories and false memories for non-critical lures.
This may explain the differences in absolute values of the IAT effect
and the D index found in our experiment. In other words, partic-
ipants assigned explicitly a high belief value to the false memories.
Thus at the explicit level they reported their subjective high belief.
This was not different for true and false memories, and thus did
not provide information to help distinguish between true and false
DRM memories. Conversely, the distinction between true and false
memories was clear when the aIAT was used, which implicitly mea-
sures the association actually present in the participants’ memory,
rather than their subjective beliefs.
It is also possible to interpret our findings in the framework
of the fuzzy trace theory (Reyna and Brainerd, 1995). According
to this theory there are two types of memory representation: gist
and verbatim. A gist representation is fuzzier (hence the name of
the theory) and includes the semantic content of an event. On the
contrary, a verbatim representation is more precise and includes
the physical structure of the event. False memories rely mainly
on the gist (Brainerd and Reyna, 2005). This theoretical proposal
would suggest that the difference detected with the aIAT might
depend on the differences in type of representation accessed for
true and false memories. They further suggest that explicit tests
might not be sensitive enough to reveal this difference, whereas
implicit measures might represent a more appropriate test.
It must be emphasized that the specific goal of the present study
was to validate the aIAT as an instrument to detect differences
between true and false DRM memories at the group level. Indeed,
we detected presented targets from critical lures by comparing
the averages of the D index obtained in two separate aIATs. This
analysis is statistically sound only when applied to the D indexes
measured from a set of subjects. For this reason, no definitive
conclusion can be drawn on whether present experimental results
indicate possible significant differences also at the individual level.
One possible manner to extend our procedure to the individual
level could be to directly compare true and false DRM memories in
a single aIAT. Further studies are needed to validate the feasibility
of this proposal.
In summary, in the present paper we reported differences
between true memories for presented targets and false memo-
ries for critical lures in a DRM task using the aIAT. These results
are relevant because they demonstrate that although true and false
DRM memories are indistinguishable at the explicit level they can
potentially be detected at the implicit level.
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